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Tom Sawyer's Apology: A Reevaluation of
United States Pesticide Export Policy
By MARK DAVID MCWILLIAMS
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
"I asked Tom if countries always apologized when they had done
wrong, and he says: 'Yes, the little ones does."'
-Mark Twain, Tom Sawyer Abroad1
American industry, faced with increasingly tight restrictions on do-
mestic sales of dangerous goods, has increased its sales of these goods
overseas. Pesticides banned for domestic use head the list of dangerous
goods which are exported; in 1976, 29 percent, or 161 million pounds, of
all the pesticides exported by the United States were either unregistered
or banned for domestic use.2 This amount is likely to increase in the
future.3
These exports have created what the United Nations World Health
Organization terms "a major health problem." 4 As one congressional
1. M. TWAIN, TOM SAWYER ABROAD, in MARK TWAIN ON THE DAMNED HUMAN
RACE 82 (J. Smith ed. 1962).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER REGULATION OF PESTICIDE EXPORTS
AND PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN IMPORTED FOOD IS ESSENTIAL, CED-79-42 (June 22, 1979) 50
[hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. See Note, Any Place But Hee. A Critique of United
States Hazardous Exports Policy, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L 329, 344 (1981). The 1976 figures
are the most recent available; see infra note 7. A recent report by columnist Jack Anderson,
however, concluded that "[e]ach year American chemical companies export nearly a billion
dollars' worth of pesticides that are unregistered, restricted or banned outright in the United
States," out of a total export amount of $2.8 billion. J. Anderson & J. Spear, We Send Our
Poisons Abroad, S. F. Chronicle, Apr. 11, 1985, at 61 col. 1. This proportion-about 36 per-
cent-roughly corroborates the GAO figure. For a discussion defining unregistered pesticides,
see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
3. INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP ON HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES E-.PORT POLICY,
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE ExEcUTIVE ORDER ON FEDERAL PoLIcY REGARDING THE
EXPORT OF BANNED OR SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED SUBsTANcEs 11 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as INTER-AGENCY REPORT]; Note, State Responsibility and Hazardous Products Exports:
A Solution to an International Problem, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J 116, 117 (1983).
4. U.S. Export of Banned Product" Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978) (statement of S. Jacob Scherr) [here-
inafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
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witness recently testified:
The sales abroad of products not permitted for use at home has
become a matter of international concern over the last few years as a
result of incidents of widespread poisoning and severe environmental
harm. There is a sense of outrage on the part of many poor countries
whose citizens are the most vulnerable to exports of hazardous drugs,
pesticides and food products.5
The tragic consequences resulting from these exports have been widely
reported.6 The most recent statistics estimate that 750,000 people in de-
veloping countries are poisoned by pesticides every year, 22,500 of them
fatally.7 These statistics almost certainly understate the problem, as de-
veloping countries routinely underreport the number of poisonings."
Poisoning statistics report only short-term acute poisoning and do not
include long-term chronic poisoning which does not manifest itself for
several years.9 Increases in population, increased demand for U.S. tech-
nology and discoveries of new toxins will probably result in more ill-
5. Id.
6. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]; 1978 Hearings, supra note 4;
K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, PILLS, PESTICIDES & PROFITS: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN Toxic SUBSTANCES (1982); D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON (1981);
Comment, U.S. Exports Banned for Domestic Use, But Exported to Third World Countries, 6
INT'L TRADE J. 95 (1980-81); Anderson & Spear, supra note 2.
The hazards of dangerous pesticide exports were recently dramatized by the disaster In
Bhopal, India, on December 3, 1984, where leakage of methyl isocyanate, a toxic chemical
used to make pesticides, killed at least 2,000 people and injured over 200,000 more. See Dia-
mond, The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1. While
this Note does not purport to address the hazards of pesticide production abroad, the dangers
are analogous. See infra note 101.
7. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 678 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr). This survey by the
World Health Organization (WHO) represents the most recent official data available, informa-
tion in this field being relatively sparse. Case studies presented at a February 1984 Pesticides
Action Network (PAN) meeting, however, indicate that the death toll from "improper mar-
keting" of pesticides may be much higher, about 400,000 lives annually. These estimates in-
clude deaths from poisonings, cancer, respiratory failure and other ailments. See MNCs
Beware" Big Critic is Watching You, 31 Bus. INT'L WEEKLY REP. 140 (May 4, 1984).
8. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 747 (statement of D. Weir and M. Schapiro). The
developing countries are afraid to report the true figures for fear of decreased tourism and
close scrutiny by the Food and Drug Administration when their products are exported to the
United States. Id
9. Id. at 678 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr). WHO has commented that figures for
deaths and poisonings do not include thousands of people who are affected by chemicals in
some other way, such as those who develop cancers ten to fifteen years later. Note, United
States Export of Banned Products: Legal and Moral Implications, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 537, 538 (1981); Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
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nesses and deaths resulting from pesticide use."° The health statistics
also do not include the adverse impacts of hazardous pesticide use on the
environment, impacts that are widely recognized."1 These environmental
problems are aggravated by the persistence and mobility of the
pesticides.12
This Note will show that current policies regarding the export of
dangerous pesticides are inadequate. Section II will describe the present
regulatory approaches, including control by international organiza-
tions, 3 liability under international law 4 and regulation by exporting
countries, 5 concluding that the U.S. policy of notification, a form of the
last approach, is currently the policy being pursued. 6 The goals of this
notification policy, which include decreasing dangerous exports, avoiding
paternalism and ensuring relevant risk/benefit analysis, will then be
outlined.1
7
Section III will show how notification fails to meet its own goals and
serves as an inadequate safeguard against dangerous exports.' 8 Section
IV will describe some elements of a proposed new policy: a shift in the
philosophy behind notification from a passive informational role to an
active regulatory posture; a shift in the presumption of safety and suita-
bility that underlies current notification policy; and development of a
process similar to the current process for registering pesticides for use in
the United States.' 9 Potential problems resulting from this new ap-
proach will also be discussed.2'
II. THE STATUS QUO IN PESTICIDE REGULATION
International organizations, international courts and national regu-
10. 1978 Hearings, supra note 4, at 3 (statement of Esther Peterson).
11. Note, Agricultural Pesticide" The Urgent Need for Harmonization of International
Regulation, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 115 (1979).
12. Mobility describes the movement of the chemicals through the environment, while
persistence describes the length of time needed for the chemical to break down into inactive
elements. Id at 114-15. See R. CARSON, SILENT SPrING (1962); C. EDvARDS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLLUTION BY PESTICIDES (1973); A. MCKNIGHT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
CONTROL-TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS 167-68 (1974); K. MELLANBY,
PESTICIDES AND POLLUTION (2d ed. 1970).
13. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 44-91 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 101-155 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 163-171 and accompanying text.
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latory bodies have all made efforts to regulate pesticide abuse or related
environmental concerns. Of these three, regulation by national bodies is
the most prominent.
A. International Organizations
Several international organizations have concerned themselves with
regulation of dangerous pesticides. Groupement International des As-
sociations Nationales de Fabricants de Pesticides (GIFAP) is an interna-
tional trade group composed primarily of pesticide producers.21 GIFAP
has been primarily concerned with cost-effective production and in-
creased availability of pesticides; these economic concerns overshadow
their proposals for uniform registration rules.22 GIFAP advocates safety
standards aimed at the "avoidance of undue risk" rather than an absolute
reduction in risk advocated by other organizations.23
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
World Health Organization (WHO) have also been involved in interna-
tional pesticide regulation.24 FAO has limited itself to studying the tech-
nical aspects of pesticides, while WHO collects general information
regarding pesticides' health effects.25 FAO and WHO together have also
21. Note, supra note 11, at 125. See GIFAP, The Two Largest Threats to the Future Flow
of Pesticides (Oct. 24, 1977), in AD Hoc GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION ON INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDIZATION OF PESTICIDES REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS (1977).
22. Note, supra note 11, at 120-2 1.
23. Id. at 125. While "avoidance of undue risk" seems consistent with standards em-
ployed by other organizations, in practice GIFAP's position favors less protection in the inter-
est of safety. For instance, when asked about U.N.-recognized pesticide poisoning problems in
Ghana, see infra note 129, GIFAP asserted the need for pesticides and the ability of importing
nations to regulate safety on their own. K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6,
at 113 (citing correspondence with GIFAP).
24. Note, supra note 11, at 123 n.61, 126 n.81. See, e.g., World Health Organization/
Food and Agricultural Organization, Guidelines for Legislation Concerning the Registration
for Sale and Marketing of Pesticides, WHO Doc. OH/69.3, FAO Doc. PL:CP/21 (1969).
The FAO formally came into being on October 16, 1945, with the signing of its Constitu-
tion. FAO's general objectives include: raising standards of nutrition; improving efficiency of
agricultural production; and generally improving the conditions of rural populations, FAO
CONST. preamble.
The WHO formally came into being on April 7, 1948, with the signing of its Constitution,
Article 2 defines several functions of WHO, including improvement of "environmental hy-
giene" and development of "international standards with respect to food, biological, pharma-
ceutical and similar products." WHO CONST. art. 2.
One commentator recently described the role of FAO and WHO: "A considerable
amount of information relating to toxicity has been generated [by FAO and WHO] in the
course of tests and studies of the effects of pesticides. However, it is difficult to determine the
extent to which the information is disseminated and utilized on an international basis," Al.
ston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 397, 413 (1978).
25. Alston, supra note 24, at 413.
[Vol. 8
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focused on the relationship between pesticides and agricultural produc-
tion, establishing the Codex Alimentarius Commission2 6 for the particu-
lar purpose of developing joint FAO/WHO maximum pesticide residue
standards for food. The Commission has developed such standards for
over 900 pesticides.27 Another United Nations organization, the United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), has assumed the primary
role of regulating world environmental problems, including the problem
of dangerous pesticide exports.28 UNEP has instituted a global pesticide
use training program and a pesticide hazard detection program and has
disseminated information on pesticide effects to developing countries.29
GIFAP, FAO, WHO and UNEP all suffer from some basic short-
comings. The United Nations has never attempted to directly control
pesticide trade, but rather has limited its role to an informational one.
30
Thus, these organizations only give advisory opinions; they have no
power to regulate. For example, only twenty-five countries, mostly de-
veloping countries, have adopted the Codex Alimentarius pesticide resi-
due standards.3 ' Since the standards are binding only when adopted by
each nation, the effective role of the standards has been largely limited to
focusing "attention on the problems" and stimulating "affirmative na-
tional action."3
None of the United Nations agencies has developed a plan for regu-
lating pesticides. As a result, the agencies react to each new problem
rather than anticipate it, thus inhibiting their ability to affect the out-
come.33 The sheer number of organizations exacerbates the lack of re-
sponse, as no one organization has the authority to regulate pesticide
exports. This overlapping authority leads to considerable confusion with
respect to which group should be responsible for regulating global pesti-
cide use.34
26. Id. at 412 n.62.
27. Alston, supra note 24, at 433.
28. Note, supra note 11, at 124; 30 U.N. Environmental Programme (3d Sess.) at 13, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GC/31 (1975). The United Nations Environmental Programme was developed
in response to the mandates of the 1972 Stockholm Conference, which included a demand that
pesticide pollution be controlled. G.A. Res. 2997,27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 43, U.N.
Doc. A/8730 (1972). For the findings of the Stockholm Conference, see Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/
14/Rev. I (1972)(Principle 6).
29. Note, supra note 11, at 124.
30. Id. at 126.
31. Alston, supra note 24, at 433.
32. Id
33. Note, supra note 11, at 126.
34. Id at 126-27.
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B. International Liability Law
Although international law imposes a duty on nations to refrain
from polluting other nations, this duty is not sufficient to require direct
regulation of pesticide exports. The leading international case establish-
ing the duty to refrain from polluting other nations is the Trail Smelter
Arbitration.35 This arbitration involved a smelter in British Columbia
which polluted the air in the state of Washington. The Trail Smelter
Arbitral Tribunal stated the rule as follows: "No State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence ... "36
This rule could conceivably be extended to impose liability on ex-
porting nations for exports of dangerous pesticides.37 There is little indi-
cation, however, that the Trail Smelter rule would require direct
regulation by exporting nations.38 The rule does not impose liability in
all cases; the interests on each side must be balanced. Also, exporting
nations are liable only when they act in an arbitrary fashion.39 Taken
together, these two prerequisites imply some lesser degree of regulation,
such as disclosure. Disclosure immediately removes the basis for liability
since the exporting nation's action is no longer considered arbitrary, and
is considered to be a reasonable remedy in light of the tradeoff between
pesticide harms and international trade.4' Indeed, those commentators
advocating extension of liability to pesticide exporters suggest only a
35. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938), re-
printed in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939). See Note, supra note 9, at 548-50.
36. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
37. Logically, pesticide production and export activities conducted in the United States
could be considered "uses of territory" within the meaning of Trail Smelter. See, e.g., Note,
Liability for Transnational Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts, 5 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 377, 379-80 (1982); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS (4th ed. 1981);
Douglas, Environmental Problems of the Oceans; The Need for International Controls, 1
ENVTL. L. 149, 154 (1971); Note, supra note 9, at 550; Note, United States Exports of Products
Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 331, 371 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Banned for Domestic Use); Note, New Perspectives on International Environmental Law, 82
YALE L.J. 1659, 1665 (1973).
38. Note, supra note 9, at 550; Note, Banned for Domestic Use, supra note 37, at 370-71.
39. Note, supra note 9, at 550.
40. Disclosure of an exporting nation's action allowing exports of pesticides is not consid-
ered arbitrary, since the receiving nation theoretically has notice of the action and an opportu-
nity to refuse or consent to the export. Disclosure is also considered to be a reasonable remedy
in light of the perceived burden on international trade; the provision of this remedy itself
renders the action less arbitrary. Id. See Arbitblit, The Plight ofAmerican Citizens Injured by
Transboundary River Pollution, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 363 (1979).
[Vol, 8
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duty of disclosure41 or warnings to importers.42
International liability law, then, might theoretically require export-
ing nations to notify recipient nations that pesticides are being shipped.
This result is consistent with U.S. policy, which mandates notification.
43
International law, however, instills no additional duty to directly regu-
late exports.
C. United States Regulations
Even with the theoretical duty under international law, the onus of
enforcement has fallen onto individual exporting nations. The United
States has three legal bases in domestic law from which it could regulate
pesticides: the Export Administration Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.
1. The Export Administration Act
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA)" authorizes the fed-
eral government to restrict exports of certain types of goods and technol-
ogy. Exports falling within the scope of EAA are placed on a
"commodity control" list.45 The Departments of State and Commerce,
working together through a special interagency committee, either grant
or deny export licenses to exporters of products on the list.
46
One purpose of EAA is "to restrict the export of goods and technol-
ogy where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international objectives."' 7 In 1980
two efforts were made to explicitly include hazardous exports within the
scope of the Act. A bill introduced by Rep. Michael Barnes (D-Md.)
4
1
would have established an export registration program for hazardous
goods under the auspices of EAA. This bill, hailed by the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council as "the first comprehensive legislation on haz-
ardous exports,"'49 died in committee.50 The Carter Administration also
41. Note, supra note 9, at 550.
42. Note, Banned for Domestic Use, supra note 37, at 371.
43. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
44. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. 1982).
45. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (Supp. 1982).
46. IML
47. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B) (Supp. 1982).
48. H.R. 6587, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
49. Export of Hazardous Product" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980)
(statement of Faith T. Campbell) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings].
50. Note, supra note 2, at 331-32.
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drafted an Executive Order establishing a comprehensive policy.51 The
Executive Order relied on notification as its primary tool, but reserved
authority to restrict hazardous exports under EAA. This policy actually
became law when President Carter signed the order on January 15, 1981.
President Reagan, however, revoked it only thirty-three days later.
52
Both policies would have faced severe implementation problems had
they been permanently adopted; these problems indicate inherent diffi-
culty with the EAA approach. The State and Commerce Departments
are the primary actors in the EAA export licensing process; they are also
the agencies "least likely to favor export controls."53 EAA also requires
"industry consultation,"5 4 a loophole which makes effective control
unlikely.
2. The National Environmental Policy Act
Another possible source of U.S. regulation is found in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).55 NEPA requires federal agencies
to consider the environmental impacts of their actions by preparing an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
56
Some argue that the NEPA EIS requirement extends to all major
federal actions regardless of where they occur.5 7 NEPA as applied to
exports of dangerous pesticides would require the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to consider the foreign environmental impact of al-
lowing exports. NEPA might also require financing agencies, such as the
Export-Import Bank, to file an EIS whenever they finance a pesticide
sale.
There are several reasons why NEPA may not be useful in control-
ling pesticide exports. First, there is some uncertainty over where to find
the "major federal action" in this context. The broadest definition of
"major federal action" would include "acquiescence by a federal agency
in nonfederal activities known to the agency and subject to prohibition at
51. Exec. Order No. 12,264, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1982), 46 Fed. Reg. 4659 (1981).
52. Exec. Order No. 12,290, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,943 (1981).
53. Note, supra note 2, at 355; 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 144 (statement of S. Jacob
Scherr).
54. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1979).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (Supp. 1982).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (Supp. 1982).
57. Krauland, NEPA, Nukes and Non-Proliferation. Clarifying the Transnational Impact
Statement Mandate in Nuclear Export Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201,
203 (1981). See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
[Vol, 8
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its discretion . ,58  One federal court adopted a similar definition,
finding that "major federal action" includes agency decisions permitting
other parties to take actions affecting the quality of the environment.59
The EIS requirement, then, would apply not only to projects and deci-
sions of an agency, but also to situations where an agency has the power
to make a decision as to nonfederal activities, but fails to exercise that
power.
60
Even this broad definition, however, would not bring pesticide ex-
ports under the aegis of the EIS requirement. No federal agency has
acted to directly regulate pesticide exports; it is agency inaction rather
than action that permits the pesticides to be shipped abroad. Moreover,
no agency has authority to directly regulate pesticide exports, as Con-
gress has limited regulatory activity to notification.6' In short, there is
no federal project, no federal regulatory decision making and no unexer-
cised federal discretion with respect to pesticide export policy. Under
these circumstances a "major federal action" would be diffcult to
pinpoint.
The second problem with NEPA concerns its applicability to for-
eign projects. There is some controversy over this subject.62 The legisla-
tive intent behind NEPA indicates that the EIS requirement does not
apply to foreign projects; a separate section establishes "cooperation" as
the basis of NEPA policy toward foreign pollution problems.63
Courts have, however, extended NEPA requirements to foreign
projects under limited circumstances. In the Sierra Club v. Coleman
cases, 64 a federal court enjoined construction of a highway in Panama for
lack of an adequate EIS. The court of appeals reversed on other grounds,
declining to rule on the applicability of NEPA to foreign projects.65 One
58. This is the view advocated by many plaintiffs in relevant NEPA cases. Note, Does
NEPA Require an Impact Statement on Inaction?, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1983).
59. Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Comm., 481 F.2d 1079,
1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
60. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (D. Del. 1972).
61. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
62. For an illustration of the controversy, compare Note, Exports and Environmental Re-
sponsibility: Applying NEPA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 CORNELL INTIL LJ. 247, 262
(1979) (legislative history and judicial interpretations indicate that NEPA applies to foreign
projects) with Burhans, Exporting NEPA: The Export-Import Bank and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1981) (NEPA does not apply to foreign
projects).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(0 (1976).
64. 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975); 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976).
65. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court found that the EIS
was in fact adequate without ruling on whether or not NEPA applied to foreign projects.
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commentator suggests that the degree of federal control over the project
and the interdependence of environmental interests between the United
States and the recipient nation might govern whether or not the federal
agency would be forced to file an EIS.66 In other words, NEPA would
not extend to foreign projects unless they were subject to federal over-
sight and also affected the environments of both the United States and
the foreign nation.
Since residues from illegal exported pesticides are often found on
food imported into the United States,67 the United States and the recipi-
ent nation have a mutual environmental interest in regulating application
of the illegal pesticides to crops. But such regulation would not meet the
"control" requirement, since the federal government has no control over
the day-to-day use of the pesticides. This control is relinquished to farm-
ers and local officials. 8 Thus, an EIS would not be required.
The third problem with using NEPA stems from its limited effect on
decision making.. Because of the controversy surrounding NEPA's appli-
cability to foreign projects, agencies have adopted foreign project EIS
requirements which are considerably weaker than domestic EIS guide-
lines. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission adopted EIS
requirements for its export licensing program which are severely limited
by exceptions and agency discretion. 9 The guidelines were held to exist
"for internal guidance only."7 In short, the EIS requirement would
probably force federal agencies regulating pesticides only to disclose in-
formation about hazards; it "would not necessarily prevent any exports
or. . . financing."71
3. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)72
is by far the most important part of U.S. pesticide export policy. FIFRA
66. Krauland, supra note 57, at 230-31.
67. According to the FDA, about 10 percent of imported food has illegal pesticide resi-
dues. This figure may be conservative. Weir & Schapiro, Pesticide Pollution Goes Multina-
tional, (1980-81) Bus. & Soc'y REv. 47, 52-53.
68. Compare Krauland, supra note 57, at 231 (reactor licensing would not meet control
requirement because the Federal government would relinquish day-to-day operations to for-
eign officials).
69. Id at 268. One part of the regulations, for example, allowed commercial considera-
tions to cut down the scope of the EIS. Id. Such a loophole applied to any EIS requirement
for pesticide exports would be fatal.
70. Id. at 265.
71. Note, supra note 62.
72. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. 1982).
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contains two major parts: the domestic registration process and the ex-
port notification process.
FIFRA requires that all pesticides used in the United States be reg-
istered with the EPA.73 A completed application for registration74 is re-
viewed by an EPA project team. A pesticide is generally approved for
registration upon completion of this review if the available data show
that "[t]he pesticide will perform its intended function without unreason-
able adverse effects on the environment and when used in accordance
with widespread and commonly recognized practice will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
' 7 5
If, however, the EPA finds in this initial review that the pesticide
has acute toxic effects, chronic toxic effects or no available antidote, 6
there is a rebuttable presumption against registration (RPAR).n The
applicant may request a hearing to rebut the RPAR finding. At the hear-
ing, the applicant must prove either that the earlier EPA findings were
incorrect or that the benefits of using the pesticide outweigh the risks.
The final registration decision is made based on the hearing record. 8
FIFRA originally required the EPA to adopt new guidelines for all
new pesticides and those previously registered under previous statutes.
This meant that EPA had to evaluate over 30,000 pesticides in less than
five years. To compound this difficulty, much of the data necessary to
enforce FIFRA did not exist.7 9 In order to deal with this difficult task,
EPA developed reregistration guidelines that in effect extended pre-1970
U.S. Department of Agriculture registrations with little additional evalu-
ation. 0 EPA later extended this treatment to registration of new pesti-
cides, invoking the "conditional registration" authority under Section
73. Id § 136a(a) states:
"No person. . may distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for sale, deliver for
shipment, or receive and (having so received) deliver or offer to deliver, to any person
any pesticide which is not registered with the Administrator [of EPA]."
74. An application must generally contain the name and address of the applicant, the
name and complete proposed label of the pesticide, a statement of claims made in favor of
registration, and data upon which the claims are based. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 162.7(d)(3)(iv) (1979).
76. Acute toxic effects are immediate consequences of a single exposure to a pesticide.
Chronic toxic effects are long-term consequences not manifested until later (eg. cancer). See
supra note 9 and accompanying text. Lack of available emergency treatment means that the
poison has no antidote. 40 C.F.R. § 162.11(a)(3) (1975).
77. 40 C.F.R. § 162.11(a)(1) (1975).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 162.1 1(b)(1)Cii)(B) (1975).
79. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENTAL AS-
SESSMENT TEAM, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF PESTICIDE REGULATORY
PROGRAMS 6.2-27 (1978 draft) [hereinafter cited as EAT REPORT]. But see infra note 166.
80. 40 C.F.R. §§ 162.7-.77 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 34,000 (1983). See infra note 165.
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3(c)(7) of FIFRA. 1 Thus, the registration process originally intended is
not really being followed. Nevertheless, EPA has banned several pesti-
cides under the modified registration process, and it is the export of these
pesticides which is causing a great deal of trouble in recipient nations.1
2
When EPA registers a pesticide for domestic use, that pesticide is
free to be exported, subject only to labelling requirements.8 3 When a
registration is denied, cancelled or suspended, or a pesticide is not sub-
jected to the registration process, however, the special FIFRA notifica-
tion procedures take effect.84 Under these procedures, exporters of
unregistered pesticides must obtain an acknowledgment statement from
the foreign purchaser.8 5 The acknowledgment must contain the name of
the purchaser, the name of the exporter and a statement that the foreign
purchaser understands the registration status of the pesticide (registered
or unregistered). 6 The foreign purchaser must return this acknowledg-
ment to the exporter 7 before the product is shipped. Where the exporter
makes several shipments of the same pesticide over more than one year,
EPA allows the acknowledgments for each shipment to be consolidated
into a single annual acknowledgment.
88
The exporter must send a copy of the acknowledgment to EPA
along with a certification that the acknowledgment was returned before
the products were shipped. These documents must be received by EPA
within seven days of receipt by the exporter.8 9 EPA then forwards a
copy of the acknowledgment to the appropriate officials in the receiving
country via the State Department. 0 EPA must also notify affected coun-
81. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7) (Supp. 1982). The basis for this policy lies in the fact that many
applications for registration of new pesticides use information already submitted for previ.
ously-registered products with similar active ingredients. EPA merely applies the results of
the prior reviews to the new products.
82. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
83. 7 U.S.C. § 136o(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
84. 7 U.S.C. § 136o(a)(2) (Supp. 1982). Notification provisions apply to:
(1) All pesticides containing an active ingredient not found in a federally-registered
product;
(2) All pesticides intended for such use as is restricted or banned by EPA; and
(3) All pesticides not similar in composition and use pattern to a federally-regis-
tered product.
45 Fed. Reg. 50,274, 50,276 (1980).
85. Id. at 50,274, 50,275. The "foreign purchaser" is the company buying the pesticide.
86. Id. at 50,277.
87. An acknowledgment is "received" when it reaches the exporter or the exporter's
agents in the receiving country. Id. at 50,276.
88. Id.
89. Id at 50,277.
90. Id. at 50,276. ("Statements will be transmitted promptly after receipt.")
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tries of any cancellation or suspension of registration. This notification
includes technical support for the decision and a list of alternative pesti-
cides, if requested.91
D. Policy Premises
As can be seen, the status quo at both the national and international
levels is premised upon the notion of "informed consent" based on notifi-
cation. Pesticides not registered for use in the United States may be ex-
-ported only when the exporter notifies the foreign purchaser and when
EPA notifies that purchaser's foreign government that the pesticide is
unregistered. Supporters of this general approach advance three reasons
for its retention. They argue that notification will reduce dangerous ex-
ports, that notification is not paternalistic and that notification ensures
an appropriate risk-benefit analysis.
1. Notification Will Work to Reduce Dangerous Exports
Theoretically, notification should ensure that recipient nations will
make informed decisions regarding pesticides used within their borders.
Those nations that want to stop the exports may do so. Even though
notification is a relatively new policy,92 there is some evidence of its suc-
cess.9 3 Proponents argue that notification procedures are a satisfactory
safeguard and there is little need for further restriction. One congres-
sional witness has testified that "[iun most cases, our Nation's interna-
tional obligations would be met through improved notification
procedures." 94
2. Notification is Not Paternalistic
Direct regulation of exports by the United States has been charac-
terized as "inappropriate."95 It has been argued that such regulation,
intended for the benefit of developing countries, "smacks of paternal-
ism." 96 One commentator provided perhaps the clearest statement of
this antipaternalism premise:
[P]olitical decisions involved in the standard-setting process...
are best left to the recipient country. Poor countries look with suspi-
cion or alarm at the environmental movement in this country. To
91. 7 U.S.C. § 136o(b) (Supp. 1982).
92. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 145 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
93. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
94. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 144 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
95. Id. at 27 (statement of Faith T. Campbell).
96. Alston, supra note 24, at 452.
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them, pollution is a 'rich man's disease' which they would like to con-
tract. Many of them are still looking forward to a nineteenth century,
a period in which their industry can develop and their gross national
product can increase without artificial limitations. Until the present,
the United States has taken everything it wanted from the earth. Even
today, an American uses up five times as much agricultural produce
and many times more energy than an Indian or a Nigerian, yet we may
be telling them to sacrifice economic growth for the sake of the
environment.
97
The current notification policy is thought to avoid this paternalism. No-
tification allows the recipient nations to formulate their own environmen-
tal policies, giving these nations the freedom to regulate pesticide use in
accordance with their own political values. Those nations which do not
want to regulate do not have to.
3. Notification Ensures a Relevant Analysis of Risks and
Benefits
Any risk/benefit analysis performed in the United States concerning
pesticide use arguably ignores the risks and benefits of pesticide applica-
tion in another country. Other nations have different problems and
might weigh risks and benefits differently.98 Each country may adopt dif-
ferent political standards:
The domestic ban on a toxic chemical may reflect either a decision
based on the unique environmental conditions prevailing in an individ-
ual nation, or a judgment that its use involves risks that are politically
unacceptable to the domestic society. In either case, the judgment is a
subjective one, based upon distinctively domestic considerations that
may or may not be applicable elsewhere.
99
Notification theoretically allows foreign officials to make these anal-
yses based solely on local standards. Supporters of the notification policy
maintain that it encourages cooperation between foreign officials and
U.S. policymakers: "The primary objective of U.S. policy should be to
assist and support foreign environmental and health officials, not to by-
pass or overrule them.""
97. Note, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International Development, 5 ECoL-
OGY L.Q. 321, 336 (1976).
98. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 26 (statement of Faith T. Campbell); Note, supra
note 97, at 335.
99. Alston, supra note 24, at 453.
100. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 26-27 (statement of Faith T. Campbell).
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III. PRESENT POLICIES FAIL TO ALLEVIATE
PESTICIDE DANGERS
Proponents of the current practice of exporting dangerous pesticides
maintain that notification results in a reduction in pesticide exports, that
it ensures that each country will formulate a risk/benefit analysis perti-
nent for it and that the policy is not paternalistic. These results, how-
ever, are not achieved merely through notification. This Section will
examine the inability of developing countries to benefit from notification
and the consequent failure of the notification policy objectives.
A. Developing Countries Lack the Ability to Effectively Utilize
Notification Information
The process of notification does not directly regulate pesticide ex-
ports. Recipient nations, most of which are developing countries, bear
the burden of utilizing the notification information to control their use of
the dangerous pesticides. The success of notification thus depends upon
the ability of these countries to analyze technical information and to reg-
ulate the importation of pesticides which may affect the environment
within their borders. Unfortunately, many developing countries are un-
able to perform these tasks effectively. One writer summarized the
problem:
Some developing countries have enacted virtually no legislation to
govern the importation, domestic use and disposal of potentially toxic
chemicals, and few maintain any facilities for monitoring the effects of
the products on health in the environment. Even where decent laws
are on the books, many governments lack the technical and adminis-
trative capacity to implement them.
10'
101. Note, supra note 6, at 98-99.
The Bhopal disaster, see supra note 6, illustrates some of the problems faced by developing
countries in dealing with hazardous pesticides. The problems in Bhopal are analogous to
problems faced by developing countries because, although India is an industrialized nation,
much of its environmental regulation is performed by the state governments whose resources
are as scarce as those in many developing countries. A recent independent investigation high-
lighted several shortcomings in the state's oversight of safety at Bhopal:
- Madhya Pradesh, the state of which Bhopal is the capital, is the largest state in
India. The state department of labor employs only 15 inspectors to monitor more
than 8,000 factories. The Bhopal office employs two inspectors, both mechanical
engineers with little knowledge of chemical hazards.
- The state inspectors have no instruments with which to measure chemical emis-
sions. Their offices sometimes lack telephones and typewriters. They must travel by
bus and train when making their inspection rounds.
- The Madhya Pradesh air and water pollution control agency has no instruments for
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Developing countries are becoming increasingly concerned about
the environment. For example, a 1980 survey reported that 102 develop-
ing countries now have some form of environmental regulatory author-
ity, as compared to only eleven in 1972.102 International aid agencies are
now incorporating environmental planning into development projects.103
Despite such improvements, however, developing countries have made
little progress in actually solving their environmental problems. As one
commentator has noted, "[w]hile there is no question that the level of
awareness about environmental problems has increased markedly in de-
veloping countries over the past decade, it is quite another matter to con-
clude that these countries are actually moving closer to alleviating the
problems. Indeed, the contrary may be true." 1"
This lack of progress in solving environmental problems has several
underlying causes. First of all, the evidence showing rising environmen-
tal awareness in developing countries is somewhat misleading, since this
awareness is centered disproportionately in urban areas. There is little
evidence that serious rural environmental problems are being ad-
dressed. 105 This disproportionate focus may operate not to eliminate en-
vironmental problems but to merely shift environmental burdens from
urban to rural areas. This trend carries disturbing implications for the
regulation of pesticide use, which is primarily a rural problem. For ex-
measuring pollution, and had not hired any new staff since new pollution laws were
adopted by the central Indian government two years before.
Diamond, The Disaster in Bhopal. Workers Recall Horror, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at 1,
col. 1. The same investigation detailed several shortcomings in the operation of the plant itself,
including inadequate training of personnel, faulty equipment, sloppy maintenance and U lack
of safety warning and containment devices, all of which contributed to the disaster. Diamond,
supra note 6. These problems typify the problems faced by developing countries in using and
controlling dangerous pesticides. Compare infra notes 104-119 and accompanying text.
102. Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A
Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1981). This growing awareness has
spawned regional environmental groups which deal with pesticide problems. These groups are
drawing the attention of exporters. For instance, one corporate newsletter reported:
The year-old Pesticide Action Network (PAN) will hold its inaugural Latin
American regional meeting in Mexico City this week. Delegates from approximately
15 countries are expected to decide on a strategy for sensitizing governments to 'the
dangers of uncontrolled proliferation' of life-threatening-and unnecessary-chemi-
cals used on farms and in factories. PAN's newest regional network (units already
operate in Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa) will move first to set up a system of
communication, most probably in the form of an action-oriented, Spanish-language
newsletter.
The MNC Critics' Hit List: What Antagonists Plan for Specific Industries, 30 BUS. INT'L
WEEKLY REP. 198, 199 (June 24, 1983).
103. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 283-84.
104. Id. at 284.
105. Id at 285.
[Vol. 8
Pesticide Export Policy
ample, if a developing country such as Guatemala considered banning
use of chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides such as DDT, such a ban
might reduce the amount of cotton that is exportable, thus altering the
balance of trade and affecting the lives of urban dwellers. 6 Since envi-
ronmental awareness is generally confined to urban areas, the govern-
ment could easily shift the costs of maintaining . healthy balance of trade
to the rural farmworkers who use the pesticides.
Developing countries which recognize the pesticide problem en-
counter further problems. Many of the regulatory bodies established to
administer the laws are merely token agencies. Nigeria's Ministry for
Environment, for example, consists only of a director, an assistant and a
secretary."0 7 Lack of resources pervades every level of a developing
country's regulatory structure.10 Many agencies have tiny budgets and
small staffs with limited authority to create and enforce rules1*9 Envi-
ronmental programs are especially vulnerable to the inherent shortage of
public funds in developing countries; many such programs have been cut
drastically in recent years.' 10 The lack of resources also manifests itself
in an acute shortage of technical expertise. A high level of technical ca-
pability is needed to determine if a pesticide is safe. A former U.S. Food
and Drug Administration director stated:
Many, if not most decisions regarding the safety of a drug or pesticide
on a consumer product involve a hugely sophisticated level of scientific
expertise and advanced technological testing resources which are not
available to all sovereign nations. Because it is available to U.S. deci-
sion makers, there is widespread reliance on those decisions by coun-
tries both with and without the capacity to make their own.
1 11
Many developing countries do not have this necessary expertise."12 Most
lack facilities for testing and evaluating pesticides and for training
106. In Guatemala pesticides are used mainly on the export cotton crop. Weir & Schapiro,
supra note 67, at 50.
In 1977 farmers in Guatemala switched from DDT to organophosphate pesticides be-
cause the pests had become immune to DDT. The new pesticides carried a lower long-term
environmental risk but were more acutely poisonous. K. ARmD, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR,
supra note 6, at 16.
107. Note, supra note 9, at 543.
108. Mollenhaur, Food Control and Consumer Protection in Developing Countries, 24
FOOD, DRUG & COSM. LJ. 259, 260 (1969), reprinted in Note, supra note 6, at 99.
109. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 308, 312.
110. Id at 302.
111. Note, supra note 3, at 119.
112. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, REPORT ON EXPORT OF PRODUCTs
BANNED BY U.S. REGULATORY AGEicins, M.R. REP. No. 1686, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27
(1978). See also 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 4 (statement of Rep. Mihael D. Barnes).
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experts.1 13
This lack of resources and expertise results in an inability of coun-
tries to effectively utilize the information provided through the notifica-
tion process. The impact can be significant, as "[t]he potential for
adverse environmental and health effects from such products is particu-
larly acute when the importing country lacks the regulatory and techni-
cal capabilities to assess a product's potential for harming its citizens or
environment."114 According to an Irish official, "[w]e are still dependent
on the United States and Britain; sometimes it takes several years before
new scientific information reaches us." '115 The problems of developing
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are far more severe. 116 Offi-
cials in charge of pesticide agencies in Colombia and Bangladesh, for
example, did not even know about the notification process.' 17  When
asked about a specific pesticide, Mirex, the Colombian official did not
know that it was dangerous, that its registration had been cancelled in
the United States or that it was even sold in Colombia. 1 8 Such cases are
far from unique.119
Pervasive as these problems are, the problem of enforcement of for-
eign pesticide restrictions is even more severe. 120 Notification does not
prevent the pesticides from being shipped to the recipient nation; the for-
eign government is often notified only after the shipments have begun.
12 1
Enforcement problems are exacerbated by the pro forma nature of the
notification to foreign purchasers. These purchasers are often merely for-
eign subsidiaries of the exporting companies which then sell the pesti-
cides without adequate regard for safety.
The recipient nation must then deal with pesticides which have al-
113. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 302. One cause of this shortage is the so-called
"brain drain," in which talented individuals from developing countries receive their training
abroad, then never return to use their talents in the service of their home countries, See Id. at
302 n.70; United Nations Commission on Trade and Development, The Reverse Transfer of
Technology: Its Dimensions, Economic Effects and Policy Implications, U.N.Doc. TD/B/
C.6/7 (1975).
114. Note, Banned for Domestic Use, supra note 37, at 332.
115. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 301.
116. Id
117. K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 34-35.
118. Id.
119. Id. See Note, Banned for Domestic Use, supra note 37, at 351; Note, supra note 9, at
543.
120. Leonard & Morel], supra note 102, at 302.
121. The FIFRA regulations state: "The Agency [EPA] does not consider that the ac-
knowledgment statement is primarily intended to serve as a preshipment notification to foreign




ready entered the country and been distributed about the countryside.
This makes enforcement of what pesticide regulations do exist in foreign
countries very difficult indeed. As one observer noted: "The most in-
tractable barriers to environmental quality in developing countries ap-
pear to be those that arise in the rural sector .... [Flew governments in
developing countries are very effective in carrying out policies and ad-ministering programs in rural sectors far removed from administrative
centers."" 2 Rules restricting pesticide use are especially susceptible to
these limits on rural authority. For instance, labelling requirements' 2 3
imposed by the United States and enforced by the local governments are
often disregarded once the pesticides reach the rural markets. Pesticide
exporters circumvent these FIFRA-imposed labelling requirements by
exporting only the active ingredients, then formulating and repackaging
the pesticides abroad. In this way, unlabelled and uncontrolled pesti-
cides find their way into the foreign market.124 One Malaysian consumer
activist found 2,4,5-T, an herbicide frequently contaminated with the
deadly substance dioxin, being sold in unlabelled bottles next to similar
122. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 306. See P- CHAMBERS, MANAGING RURAL
DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS AND EXPERIENCES FROM EAST AFRiCA (1974); U. LELE, THE DE-
SIGN OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT: LEssONs FROM AFRICA (1975).
123. Labels for pesticides shipped overseas must now meet most of the standards applied to
pesticides sold in the United States. 7 U.S.C. § 136(o) (Supp. 1982). These include the
following:
(1) False or misleading representations on the label are prohibited;
(2) The pesticide must not be an imitation of another pesticide
(3) The label of the pesticide must bear the registration number of the estab-
lishment in which it was produced;
(4) The statements on the pesticide's label required under FIFRA must be
conspicuous and in terms likely to be read and understood by an ordinary individual;
(5) The label must contain necessary warning or cautionary statements-
(6) If the pesticide is not registered in the United States, the label must contain
a conspicuous statement to that effect;
(7) The label must contain an ingredients statement;
(8) The label must contain a statement of use classification ("general use" or
"restricted use") under which the pesticide is registered;
(9) The container must bear a label providing the name and address of the
producer, the name, brand, or trademark under which the pesticide is sold, the net
weight or measure of the contents of the container, and the registration number as-
signed to the pesticide; and,
(10) If the pesticide is highly toxic, the label must bear the skull and cross-
bones, and the word "poison" in red, and information regarding an antidote.
40 C.F.R. § 162.10 (1978); see K. AHMED, . RiCHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 30.
124. An official of the Agency for International Development (AID) explained:
"The laws in less developed countries typically say no repackaging of pesti-
cides. .. . But in the villages it is done routinely. Parathion, in Coke bottles stuffed
with newspapers, with no label, is typical."
Weir & Schapiro, supra note 67, at 51.
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bottles containing cooking sauce.1 25 An FAQ official described a similar
situation in Indonesia: "Small shops in Indonesia sell pesticides right
alongside the potatoes and rice and other foods. . . . The people just
collect it in sugar sacks, milk cartons, Coke bottles-whatever is at
hand." '1 26 In Kenya, DDT is sold in unlabelled packages at international
fairs, even though DDT has been publicly withdrawn from the market in
Kenya.127
The enforcement problem is exacerbated because the people who
handle and who are exposed to the pesticide are often poor, illiterate
farm workers who do not understand that the chemicals are poison-
ous.128 In one village in Ghana, for instance, people poured lindane into
Lake Volta to kill fish for food, not realizing that the substance also
poisoned humans. 29 The harmful effect of the pesticides is aggravated by
the almost total lack of medical care in these countries. In 1979 a deputy
director of the World Health Organization estimated that eighty to
eighty-five percent of people living in Africa and Asia had no access to
even minimal health care.
1 30
Finally, enforcement of pesticide rules is linked to the political sta-
tus of the victims. Most of the farmworkers must continue to work
whether they get poisoned or not. An entomologist working in Central
America described life on a typical farm:
The people who work in the fields are treated like half-humans, slaves
really. When an airplane flies over to spray, they can leave if they
want to. But they won't be paid their seven cents a day or whatever.
They often live in huts in the middle of the field, so their homes, their
children, and their food all get contaminated. 131
Overall, developing countries have made little progress in regulating
pesticides. Many countries have not enacted laws or have adopted policy
positions favoring urban populations. Almost all countries which have
adopted laws do not have sufficient staffing with the requisite technical
skill to enforce these laws. The lack of resources, shortage of facilities
and low educational and economic status of the farmers make enforce-
ment of pesticide regulation virtually impossible and notification mean-
125. K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 32.
126. Weir & Schapiro, supra note 67, at 51.
127. K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 21.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id. at 13-14.
130. Health Priorities in the Developing World, COURIER, Jan./Feb. 1979, at 40 (statement
of Dr. T. Adeyo Lambo).
131. Weir & Schapiro, supra note 67, at 48.
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ingless. These problems are complex and intractable, and they inhibit
the success of any pesticide regulation program based in the importing
developing countries.
B. Notification Does Not Serve Its Policy Premises
Ultimately, the success of notification must be judged by how well it
fulfills its policy premises. Any realistic discussion must occur in the
context just set forth; namely, how well does notification work in light of
developing countries' inability to use the information?
1. Notification Does Not Decrease Dangerous Pesticide Exports
Given the problems detailed above,132 it is hard to believe that many
dangerous exports are halted by notification. One 1982 study evaluated
the impact of notification and found that few dangerous pesticide exports
are prevented:
Even assuming that exported pesticides are shipped to Third
World countries in properly labelled containers, to purchasers who
have been informed of the products' risks, with the knowledge and
consent of the purchasers' governments, we cannot conclude that
workers in those countries, and residents of the areas where the pesti-
cides will be used, have any protection. Informed consent on the part
of the purchaser means little if the purchaser is simply a foreign sub-
sidiary of the producing company. Government knowledge of
purchases of banned pesticides is of little value if there is no regulatory
capability in the importing country to stop the continued importation
or prevent the improper use of those chemicals. All of these problems
pertain, to some extent, to Third World countries.1
3 3
The failure of notification to decrease exports of dangerous pesti-
cides may also be inferred from projected increases in pesticide exports.
A recent report by the U.S. government indicated that exports of danger-
ous pesticides would increase.1 34 A separate report by the General Ac-
counting Office predicted that between 1974 and 1984 the use of
pesticides in Africa would quintuple.135 One commentator has noted
that pesticide producers in the United States, faced with saturated do-
mestic markets, have begun looking to sell their products in foreign mar-
132. See supra notes 101-131 and accompanying text.
133. K. AHmED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 31.
134. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
135. Weir & Schapiro, supra note 67, at 48. While more recent statistics are unavailable,
there is little reason to doubt such predictions have come to pass.
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kets. 1'36 In short, notification apparently will have little effect in curbing
the rise in exports of dangerous and nondangerous pesticides.
Recent reports show that three countries-South Korea, Canada,
and Ecuador-have, upon receiving notifications of hazardous exports,
restricted shipments of the dangerous products into their countries.' 37
This is undoubtedly good news and serves as evidence that notification
can work in some circumstances. But South Korea and Canada are rela-
tively developed nations with more sophisticated governments and envi-
ronmental controls; their successes cannot be generalized to developing
countries. Although Ecuador is a developing country, its limited success
in restricting such dangerous imports appears to be an isolated instance.
Notification, then, probably will not decrease exports of dangerous pesti-
cides. The severe problems of implementation and enforcement faced by
developing countries and the rising tide of pesticide exports make any
reduction in exports unlikely.
2. Paternalism is a Necessary Element of Any Policy Short of
Caveat Emptor
Few would suggest that the fear of paternalism outweighs the need
to regulate pesticide exports when the recipient nation has no informa-
tion. Application of the doctrine of caveat emptor to the international
marketplace has been universally criticized.' 38
Given that caveat emptor is an undesirable policy option with regard
to pesticide sales, three possible types of export regulation remain open to
the U.S. government. The government may do as it does now: notify
foreign governments, but provide no technical assistance. Alternatively,
the government might notify foreign governments and provide technical
assistance to help in analyzing and using the information provided by
notification. Finally, the government might directly regulate the export
of dangerous pesticides by examining them prior to export.
Each of these three policies involves some degree of paternalistic
behavior on the part of the United States. When the policies are com-
pared, direct regulation appears to be no more paternalistic than the
136. Id. See Anderson & Spear, supra note 2.
137. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 144-45 (testimony of S. Jacob Scherr).
138. See, eg., Note, supra note 6, at 95 n.2. Caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware,"
refers to the doctrine requiring the purchaser of a product to examine, judge and test the
product, while imposing no duty on the seller. Caveat emptor as applied to the sale of con-
sumer goods has been replaced by strict liability, warranty rules and consumer protection laws,
BLACK'S LAw.DicTiONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
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other policies. This comparative analysis suggests that direct regulation
should not be rejected solely because it is paternalistic.
The present policy of notifying developing countries without provid-
ing technical assistance resembles a policy of caveat emptor. As has been
shown, the developing countries are informed only in a formal sense, as
they have neither the skill nor the resources to use the information pro-
vided; thus, for all intents and purposes, they are not "informed." Virtu-
ally the only source of information that an importing country may
receive about pesticide safety and other matters outside the scope of the
notification process comes from the corporations exporting the pesti-
cides. In the absence of government help, developing countries have lit-
tle or no choice but to rely on these corporations for information and
assistance. This dependence has evolved into what one internationally-
known consumer activist calls the "unholy alliance,"13 9 and amounts to
virtual self-regulation. The chief agriculturist of the Nairobi Irrigation
Board described his view of the situation:
Pesticide manufacturers normally have local representatives... in-
form potential buyers of their products. They come loaded with a lot
of information-often information that one cannot read immediately-
regarding the efficacy of the product and where it has been registered.
It is very difficult for less developed countries, particularly small ones
such as Kenya, to spare enough manpower to check and cross check
all this information and to assure that the product has been registered
in a given country as claimed.140
The nature and quality of the information provided by the pesticide
sellers varies. GIFAP 14 1 recently released a set of minimum guidelines
for the safe handling of pesticides. 42 In promulgating this information,
GIFAP wished to establish a cooperative relationship between the pesti-
cide exporters and local governments. One corporate newsletter noted:
Companies were concerned that regulations were being intro-
139. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 14 (statement of Anwar Fazel).
140. K. AHMED, R. RIcHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 36.
141. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
142. Dealing With Critics Some Lessons Learned in Latin America, 30 BUs. INr.L
WEEKLY REP. 115, 116 (April 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Dealing With Critics]. These
guidelines covered formulation, packing, transport, and methods of maintaining occupational
safety and environmental health. GIFAP printed 10,000 copies of these guidelines; demand
was so great that they were distributed within five months. The group that wrote the guide-
lines is currently writing a first-aid manual and a technical manual about the safe use of pesti-
cides, both to be published in four languages. Id
It is questionable whether meaningful safety guidelines can be written for pesticides so
dangerous that their use in developed countries has been completely banned.
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duced in a scattershot fashion, posing a clear operational challenge to
that majority of agrochemical MNCs with facilities in several (or
many) countries. An informal, industry-sponsored panel might pro-
vide governments with technical capabilities to devise meaningful con-
trols on pesticide use. It would lead ultimately to a more stable
regulatory environment through regionwide harmonization of im-
proved national standards."'
143
Whether or not "meaningful" controls and a "stable regulatory environ-
ment" reflect an adequate concern for safety is unclear. Many local offi-
cials are skeptical about the intentions of the exporters.144 Some feel that
pesticide salesmen are more interested in promoting their products than
in sharing safety information. 145 The sellers do not always take the best
interests of the buyers into account, as a 1979 Bolivian incident
illustrates:
[A]n avalanche of salesmen had persuaded farmers to abandon
traditional crop-rotation agriculture in favor of the use of pesticides.
When a plague of moths appeared, the salesmen recommended more
and different pesticides which resulted in a different and more resistant
strain of moths. Some of the farmers committed suicide by drinking
the pesticides which had destroyed their crops. 'They think they are
the killers of Pachamama-Mother Earth,' one farmer reportedly
said.
146
In the absence of aid from the United States, then, multinational
corporations assume the role of providing information. This role is pa-
ternalistic because the corporations have a tremendous information ad-
vantage over the buyers. Sellers may dictate the kinds and amounts of
pesticides that are "best;" and users, having little or no information of
their own, often must accept those judgments as truth. Many people in
developing countries, moreover, believe that this domination by sellers in
the decision making process is paternalistic. Decisions made by the sell-
ers often result in higher levels of pollution and poisoning; local residents
often view the consequences as symbols of outside control over their
lives. One commentator described an analogous situation in one part of
Spain: "[E]nvironmental protest has become an important way to ex-
press Basque support for regional autonomy. Industrial pollution, par-
ticularly in Bilbao, is viewed as a result and a symbol of external control
143. Id.
144. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
145. 1978 Hearings, supra note 4, at 47 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
146. Note,.supra note 3, at 329-30.
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over the Basque economy."147 Rising environmental awareness in devel-
oping countries"4 suggests that people in those countries are at least as
resentful of this "paternalistic pollution" policy as they are opposed to
direct regulation by the U.S. government.
This situation would change if the United States were to offer tech-
nical assistance along with information by means of notification to devel-
oping countries. Governments in these countries would be better able to
evaluate the extent of the hazard presented by the pesticide exports if
they were assisted by outside experts who would, presumably, work di-
rectly with local officials. Developing countries would no longer have to
rely exclusively on information provided by the pesticide sellers.
The most progressive reforms currently offered in the field of pesti-
cide exports advocate this policy as a way to balance the competing con-
cerns of reducing unrestricted pesticide exports and paternalism. 149 In
addition to practical and political problems inherent in such a pro-
gram, 5 ' however, the technical assistance alternative would also be pa-
ternalistic in at least two ways. In evaluating the need for technical
assistance in particular developing countries, Congress would have to
closely examine the ability of that country to make its own decisions.
This examination would be paternalistic because it would require a value
judgment by Congress on the efficacy of a government's health policy,
which in turn would involve a more general examination of that coun-
try's basic social structure and priorities. Also, assistance would proba-
bly be provided by U.S. experts-scientists, technicians and
administrators. These advisors would by definition hold an immense ad-
vantage over their local counterparts because of their expertise; conse-
quently, it is foreseeable that the experts would make all the decisions, or
147. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 289.
148. See id. at 288-89. In Latin America, for instance, local opposition to pesticide exports
forced exporters to take action:
Swift action by US and European pesticide manufacturers has averted a new
wave of conflicting, counterproductive standards in key Latin American markets.
Four US MNCs-Dow Chemical, Du Pont, Monsanto and FMC Corp-together
with the UK's Imperial Chemical Industries, Germany's Bayer, the Netherlands'
Royal Dutch/Shell, and France's chemical giant Rhone-Poulenc, are lead partici-
pants in a regional industry-goverment consultation project aimed at reducing po-
tential conflict between the two groups. The effort ranks as one of the largest such
undertakings by the private sector to date and comes at a time of mounting activist
pressure against the export of agricultural pesticid. [emphasis added.]
Dealing With Critics, supra note 140, at 115.
149. See, eg., 1978 Hearings, supra note 4, at 33 (testimony of S. Jacob Scherr).
150. Technical assistance of this kind would probably be expensive and might be viewed by
domestic policymakers as duplicative, since technical facilities already exist in the United
States. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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at least provide crucial insight. The health ministries in the developing
countries would, in effect, become regulatory arms of the U.S. govern-
ment, bringing with them all the perceived dangers of paternalism. This
policy seems, in fact, more paternalistic than the other alternatives, since
outside experts would dominate the day-to-day operations of the govern-
ment rather than merely developing general policies, as is done by the
United States.
Direct regulation would undoubtedly be paternalistic in that devel-
oping countries would not be allowed to buy pesticides freely as they do
now. Under such regulation, exports would be subject to review and re-
striction by the U.S. government.151 Compared with the other alterna-
tives, however, direct regulation at the point of export appears no more
onerous, and is certainly no more paternalistic than technical assistance,
whereby outside advisors would manage the environmental affairs of de-
veloping countries. Also, a policy of "paternalistic prevention" which
regulates pesticide exports in the interest of safety is preferable to the
current seller-dominated policy of "paternalistic pollution;" direct regu-
lation is no more paternalistic than the current policy, and ensures safety
to a greater extent.15 2
3. Notification Does Not Ensure an Appropriate Risk/Benefit
Analysis
Some countries may have different conditions which justify using
products which would not be used in the United States.1 53 Notification
arguably allows recipient nations to freely make their own risk/benefit
determinations on a case-by-case basis, taking into account these differ-
ent conditions.
Notification does not, however, guarantee that these analyses will be
conducted; rather, by shifting the responsibility for analysis to the recipi-
ent nation, notification significantly increases the likelihood that no anal-
ysis will be conducted. As developing countries lack the resources to
examine the risks and benefits associated with the pesticides, they rarely
perform such analyses. 154 Thus, pesticides might be exported to these
nations not necessarily because of some special need but because there
151. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
152. Some may argue that there are relative degrees of paternalism, and that one policy
may possibly be more paternalistic than others. Whatever the merits of this argument, com-
pany control of information and technical assistance in the developing countries seems at least
equally paternalistic, if not more so.
153. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 101-131 and accompanying text.
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are no restrictions on use of the pesticides; they may be "dumped" freely
in those nations.
Notification is even less appropriate in light of the hazards known to
exist in many of the exported pesticides. The most dangerous pesticides
are those already examined and banned from use in the United States.
Allowing export after notification raises the presumption that these
banned pesticides are appropriate for foreign use, a presumption which is
clearly contrary to common sense. Recipient nations bear the illogically-
imposed burden of stopping these exports, yet many recipient nations are
clearly ill-equipped to do so."'
IV. ELEMENTS OF A NEW POLICY
The previous analysis suggests that notification does not meet its
intended goals. It does not appear to reduce exports of dangerous pesti-
cides, is no less paternalistic than alternative policies and does not ensure
that developing countries will perform the appropriate risk/benefit analy-
ses. In short, the basic philosophical assumptions which support notifi-
cation-indeed, support any kind of passive information-disseminating
role-are of questionable validity.
Questioning these assumptions is a necessary first step in formulat-
ing a new regulatory approach. Given the circumstances in which most
recipient nations find themselves, the philosophy of informed consent
based on notification is a fiction. The United States should stop perpe-
trating this fiction and should assume the responsibility for its exports
rather than forcing developing countries to do so. It should change its
philosophy from that involving a passive informational role to that of an
active regulatory one.
A major consequence of the current export philosophy is the pre-
sumption of safety and suitability created by the notification policy.
Problems in the export context arise mainly with pesticides that are un-
registered or restricted."5 6 These pesticides are either not evaluated or
have already been found by the Environmental Protection Agency to
cause adverse environmental impacts. By requiring only notification
before export, the law in effect conclusively presumes that any pesticide,
even those with known hazards or unknown effects, are safe and suitable
for use in the recipient nation. This presumption is based upon no find-
ing of fact or rational policy and should be changed. EPA should estab-
lish an export review process fashioned after the domestic RPAR
155. Id
156. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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process.157 When EPA bans or restricts a pesticide for domestic use, a
rebuttable presumption against export should also arise.'58 Exporters
would then have an opportunity to rebut the presumption by showing
that the benefits of using the pesticide in the foreign country outweigh
the risk involved. For example, DDT would carry a rebuttable presump-
tion against export since it has been banned for most domestic uses.' 5 9 A
company wishing to export DDT could present evidence that DDT is
needed in the recipient nation to combat malaria, a use which might well
be worth the risk of the cancers known to be caused by DDT. After
weighing the risks and benefits, EPA could determine whether the pesti-
cide should be exported. This is similar to the kind of determination
EPA makes about the domestic use of pesticides in the RPAR process.
The current notification mechanism should be used to apprise for-
eign officials of pending decisions on pesticide exports. Notice should be
given of important hearings sufficiently in advance to allow participation
by the potential recipient nation. This would allow the recipient nation
to (1) participate in the process and give its views on risks and benefits,
and (2) exercise prior exclusion, banning entry of the pesticide while en-
forcement is still possible. 1"
EPA could enlist the assistance of international organizations since
these organizations have been effective in fostering environmental aware-
ness in developing countries. 161 Even though these organizations have
failed to regulate international pesticide trade, they have been particu-
larly adept at gathering information on worldwide pesticide problems,
specific needs of developing countries and global environmental
trends.162 This information would be helpful to EPA in the review pro-
cess; international organizations could help elicit responses from the re-
cipient nations to questions concerning local pesticide needs,
environmental values and other relevant issues. While these organiza-
157. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
158. From this proposition follows the notion that pesticides registered for use in the
United States should be presumed safe for export. Problems, however, arise concerning (I) the
status of new or untested pesticides, and (2) the status of pesticides classified for restricted use
in the United States.
Whether or not the United States should directly regulate exports of new or restricted-use
pesticides is a more difficult question which is beyond the scope of this Note.
159. DDT carries a rebuttable presumption against registration. Consolidated DDT Hear-
ings, 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369 (July 7, 1972). See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DDT:
A REvIEW OF SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE DECISION TO BAN ITS USE AS A
PESTICIDE 243 (1975).
160. Compare supra note 121 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
162. Leonard & Morell, supra note 102, at 286-88.
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tions would probably not be appropriate parties in the formal review pro-
cess, EPA should develop a close working relationship with them to
improve its decision making on export matters.
Such cooperation with international organizations would help allevi-
ate one problem with the review concept-the lack of information. De-
veloping countries do not have the capacity to really study pesticide
problems, and the information that they have may be minimal. Along
with international organization cooperation, EPA could develop its own
sources utilizing existing connections in the Commerce Department and
State Department. 163 As one expert has stated:
... EPA's international affairs office is not now equipped to eval-
uate the impact of a particular chemical in a particular country....
However, I believe that within a short time of enactment of this legisla-
tion EPA or the other regulatory agencies and the Commerce Depart-
ment could work out a mechanism of consultation with foreign
governments that would give them fairly quickly the kinds of answers
they would need to make the determination [of risks and benefits]."'
Exporters will also have an incentive to develop information on the risks
and benefits of pesticide use in recipient nations, since under the RPAR
process they themselves proposed, they will have the burden of proving
that the need for their pesticides in those countries outweighs the safety
hazards.
Another problem with direct regulation by EPA is the questionable
performance of the EPA domestic registration program. Several reports
have criticized both the data collection and data evaluation processes of
the EPA.' 65 One report went so far as to say: "The pesticide registration
163. For instance, the current notification process uses State Department diplomatic chan-
nels and attaches in United States embassies. These channels could be used to obtain informa-
tion from the foreign countries and provide it to EPA.
164. 1980 Hearings, supra note 49, at 39 (statement of Faith T. Campbell).
165. See, ,g., EAT REPORT, supra note 79; Cancer-ausing Chemicals--Part 2, Chemical
Contamination of Food- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) (statement
of Henry Eschwege, General Accounting Office); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DELAYS
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES PLAGUE NEW PESTICIDE PROTECTION PROGRAMS (Report By the
Comptroller General of the United States, February 15, 1980); STAFF OF THE SENATE Sun-
COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENcY AND THE
REGULATION OF PESTICIDES (CoMM. Print 1976); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCAION
AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RE-
LATIONSHiP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (December 1969).
Problems of fraud have also come up in EPA testing. The most blatant example involved
Industrial Bio-Tests (IBT), a laboratory which supplied over 1,600 studies on more than 200
pesticides to EPA on behalf of manufacturers. EPA failed to audit IBT and did not review the
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program is in a state of chaos, and the American people cannot be rea-
sonably assured that the Federal government is protecting them from
pesticides that pose a serious threat to their health."' 66 Although the
EPA review process has been shown to be deficient, it is certainly better
than no review at all. Moreover, EPA has effectively reviewed and
banned or restricted several pesticides now being used widely abroad:
DDT, parathion, aldrin, dieldrin and dioxin, to name only a few. 167 Re-
moval of these pesticides from the export market would significantly im-
prove the international pesticide problem. In addition, public disclosure
of data used by EPA and other reforms might improve the accuracy and
objectivity of the overall review process.1
68
Finally, there is a possibility that U.S. exports might decline as a
result of restrictions on pesticides. The potential impact of such a decline
on overall economic health is unclear, since most of the pesticide export-
ers are giant multinational corporations. 69 In the long run, though, the
increasing environmental awareness in developing countries suggests that
the "dumping" of dangerous goods will become less lucrative. The Back-
ground Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Hazardous Sub-
stances Export Policy concluded in 1981 that:
U.S. manufacturers have a strong stake in fostering a positive atti-
tude among foreign governments and consumers toward products
bearing the label 'Made in U.S.A.' Sale abroad of banned products
tends to undermine foreign confidence in American-made products.
studies carefully. An independent Food and Drug Administration review found that IBT oli-
cials were falsifying test results; four top IBT officials were indicted as a result. Several tests
were found to be invalid. For example, one IBT study on the pesticide captan was altered to
show sixteen tumors in the control group but none in the test group. Such data would support
the conclusion that captan was a cure for cancer. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 256 (testi-
mony of Ralph Lightstone, California Rural Legal Assistance).
166. EAT REPORT, supra note 79, at 6.2-29.
The American Farm Bureau Federation, an unusual source of criticism, described the
domestic pesticide situation in 1981:
Although there are over 1200 active pesticides currently registered, over 90 per-
cent of the agriculture poundage used involves only 150 active ingredients. Nearly
all of agriculture's '150' still carry the registrations issued by USDA prior to 1970.
EPA has failed to review these product registrations under the more demanding stan-
dards of today's law, failed to classify for restricted or general use according to prod.
uct hazard and, according to EPA testimony of a month ago, may take up to 40 years
to complete the job.
1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 280-81 (statement of Bruce R. Hawley, Assistant Director,
National Affairs Division, American Farm Bureau Federation).
167. K. AHMED, R. RICHTER & S. SCHERR, supra note 6, at 33.
168. 1981 Hearings, supra note 6, at 320 (statement of Prof. Thomas 0. MeGarity).
169. Since the sellers are large, prohibiting sales of dangerous pesticides would probably
not destroy the sellers economically. Weir & Schapiro, supra note 67, at 47.
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Among the potential consequences are losses in export trade and thus
negative effects on our balance of payments, and possible adverse long-
term effects on foreign markets.
70
Companies selling hazardous products in foreign countries may be dis-
placing or discrediting U.S. companies that are selling safe products in
those countries. 17 1 Most importantly, though, selling poisons to unsus-
pecting customers for the sake of economic health is morally indefensible
and cannot be recognized as a legitimate domestic policy.
V. CONCLUSION
What few statistics are available from developing countries indicate
that pesticides too dangerous for use in the United States are being ex-
ported to these countries. Domestic and international legal principles
have evolved slowly to deal with this problem. Since many developing
countries cannot take advantage of the current policies, the problems as-
sociated with exports of dangerous pesticides persist almost as if no regu-
lation existed.
The law must continue to evolve. Present policies that disseminate
information and provide notification are necessary first steps toward a
legal principle of equal treatment of domestic and international hazards
created by U.S. products. Such a principle does not force U.S. values
upon foreign countries; rather, it gives importing countries a chance to
control the products they import and a real choice in deciding which
pesticides to use.
By assuming an active regulatory role, the United States would have
the opportunity to redress a mistaken policy. In a world where the little
countries seem to do all the apologizing, the United States can do a great
service in phrasing an apology of its own.
170. INTER-AGENCY REPORT, supra note 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 7806 (1981).
171. See Note, Hazardous Exports From a Human Rights Perspective, 14 Sw. U.L REv.
81, 100-101 (1983).
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